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The Doctors' Right to Strike
By BERNARD D. MELTZER
This paper was the basis of a talk delivered to the Jackson Park
Medical Society in Chicago on October 18, 1962. Mr. Meltzer
is professor of law at the University of Chicago. This article
is reprinted from the February, 1962 Labor Law. journal.
I CONSIDER IT A MELANCHOLY COMMENTARY on our
times that your Society should find our topic for tonight of in-
terest. My reaction is not meant to reflect any general condemnation
of strikes in industrial struggles but arises from quite different con-
siderations: First, a community should feel uneasy about its institu-
tions when physicians even flirt with the idea of combining to suppress
or to suspend their historic devotion to healing in order to achieve
economic or political ends. Secondly, lawyers as well as doctors, and
especially those on university faculties, should also feel uneasy about
the prospect that our two professions may lack the skill to devise
accommodations that would avoid war on the sick as an instrument
of medical policy. I take it that episodes in Saskatchewan and else-
where have given substance to such possibilities and have produced
our agenda for tonight.
Since your invitation has made me melancholy, I may be justified
in repaying you in kind with a tedious and dull talk. As I will soon
demonstrate, I am well equipped for that purpose.
The regulation of the right to strike always reflects an attempt
to balance the right of a group to pursue its own interest or its own
view of the good life and the welfare of the general community.
Where, as in the case of employees in a manufacturing plant, the strike
problem has been a recurring one, the law's guidelines are relatively
clear. In the case of doctors, the community fortunately has had prac-
tically no experience with so-called strikes. As a consequence, we do
not have a body of law pinpointed to the problems resulting from
organized pressure by doctors to achieve their ends. This is not to
say that legal restraints would not be developed. On the contrary, as
medical associations have learned, and as we will see in a moment, the
law has enormous flexibility and especially so when a group supplying
vital services disregards its own symbolic code.
Before turning to the law, it may be useful to say a word about
doctors and about strikes.
It would be presumptuous for me to tell you about the social role
or the historic traditions of doctors, even though such an effort might
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involve a turnabout interesting to the
psychiatrists among you. But I do
want to fit doctors into the categories
through which the law does, or at least
rationalizes, its work. Some doctors
are employees of industry, universities,
the government, or nonprofit organiza-
tions. Since life has been defined as
an underpaid occupation, such em-
ployee-doctors might be tempted to
strike for more. If they were federal
government employees, they would
be violating a statute and would be
subject to immediate discharge and
other noncriminal sanctions. If they
were state employees, they would fre-
quently be violating similar statutes
or judge-made rules. The law is more
uncertain as to doctors and other per-
sonnel who are employees of non-
governmental entities, but some cases
suggest that strikes by employees of
not-for-profit hospitals are unlawful
and enjoinable." Although such strikes
have not, of course, involved doctors,
the restraints that they have imposed
on hospital attendants, etc., would
apply with even greater force to doc-
tors who were employees of not-for-
profit institutions, and, perhaps, of
other institutions.
Object of Concern
Is the Private Practitioner
I take it, however, that you are
concerned not with strikes by em-
ployee-doctors but with strikes by
doctors in private practice. The law
divides such practitioners into two
parts. First, the law recognizes that
they are, of course, members of a
noble and learned profession, gen-
erally devoted to the high ideals and
the overriding commitment to the art
and science of healing expressed in the
memorable Hippocratic oath. Inci-
'See generally, Mount Sinai Hospital, Inc.
v. Davis, 188 N. Y. S. 2d 338 (Sup. Ct. N. Y.
Co., Part I, 1959) 37 LC 11 65,493; contra,
Mount Sinai Hospital, Inc., v. Davis, 190
N. Y. S. 2d 870 (Sup. Ct. N. Y. Co., Part I,
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dentally, it is of no particular im-
portance if you no longer formally
take that oath; the community will
nevertheless hold you to its ideals
because your functional responsibility
and the power of self-regulation granted
by the state presupposes those ideals.
To the law, the practitioner is not
only a member of a learned profes-
sion; he is also a business man or an
independent contractor. As such, the
doctor has to set prices, buy equip-
ment, frequently meet a payroll, and
do many other tedious things neces-
sary to keep his enterprise afloat and
to feed himself and his family.
Independent Contractors
Since practitioners are independent
contractors and not employees, the
social attitudes and the statutes which
in general affirm and protect the right
of employees to strike are not ap-
plicable, let alone controlling.2 In-
deed, since medical practitioners are
not employees, purists might suggest
that "strike" is applied to them is a
misnomer, that the correct term is
"boycott"-a term that usually sug-
gests malignant rather than benign
pressure. In any event, the doctor's
role as a businessman makes him
vulnerable to the law when he has
been unduly-a lawyer's weasel-word
-distracted from his primary com-
mitment to the art of healing and
when he combines with his colleagues
to achieve business or political ends
Definition of Strike Clarified
Having told you about yourselves,
I want to add a word about the term
"strike." A strike is usually con-
sidered a concerted and temporary
withdrawal by employees of their
services for the purpose of forcing or
1959) 37 LC 165,695; see also W. Pa.
Hospital v. Lichliter, 340 Pa. 382 (1941), 3
LC 1160,292.
2 See cases cited at footnote 1.
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achieving an economic concession
from an employer. If several em-
ployees carry out individual decisions
tc quit an employer forever because
he is a skin-flint or a John Bircher or
a Communist, they are not striking,
for two reasons. First, such employees
have not combined; secondly, they
don't expect to come back. An indi-
vidual employee's right to quit is an
important aspect of freedom-and
that right, in time of peace 't least,
is in general included within the con-
stitutional protection against involun-
tary servitude.
A medical practitioner may, if he
wishes, also quit his profession to
become a piccolo player or a lotus
eater. But when he combines with
others to withdraw medical services
in order to achieve a political or an
'economic end, the fact of combination
makes an important difference. The
reason is plain: If a significant num-
ber of businesses agree to withhold
their goods or services, there is an
obvious threat to the interests of con-
sumers, that is, all of us. Thus, if
Ford and General Motors should
agree to stop selling cars to the gov-
ernment until it raises the prices it
will pay for cars, or until it stops
regimenting businessmen, the auto
companies would violate the law.
And if doctors combine for similar
purposes, that, is, if they combine as
businessmen do, they are likely, as I
suggested, to be treated like business-
men.
Legal Weapons
The law has several weapons for
this purpose. On the national level
there is, of course, the Sherman Anti-
Trust Act, a criminal statute. The
Supreme Court, as some of you know,
held that the American Medical As-
"American Medical Association v. United
States, 317 U. S. 519 (1943), 6 LC 51,153.
1 United States v. Oregon State Medical
Society, 343 U. S. 326, 3,36 (1952).
sociation had violated that statute
when it sought to prevent group medi-
cine on a prepayment basis in the
District of Columbia by threatening
to expel participating doctors from
medical societies and by depriving
them of contacts with other doctors
and of hospital facilities.5 It is true
that the A. M. A. case arose in the
District of'Columbia and that, as a
result, the government was not re-
quired to prove an effect on inter-
state commerce. It is also true that
the Court refused to rule whether the
practice of medicine is a "trade" under
the Sherman Act, and that the Court
in another case has recognized that
ethical considerations in the relation-
ship between doctor and patient differ-
entiate that relationship from ordinary
commercial ones.' But the Court's
approach underscores the risk that
doctors who look to the market place
for models of economic or political
warfare will get short shrift when
they invoke their ethical traditions as
a basis for a special exemption from
the law governing the market place.
There are similar antitrust laws on
the state level-laws which dispense
with any necessity to prove an effect
on interstate commerce. And there
is in addition a historic policy against
restraint of trade, whose roots go back
to the English' law of pre-colonial
times. A few years ago a California
court invoked that policy in ruling
that the practice of medicine was a
trade for some regulatory purposes.5
Although the law has a broad range
of weapons, I do not mean to suggest
that one of them would necessarily
be applied to anything that might be
called a doctors' strike. Indeed, our
topic is so vague that I am somewhat
uncomfortable about discussing it,
except in equally vague terms. My
'Tatkin v. Superior Court, 160 Cal. A. 2d
745, 326 P. 2d 201 (1958).
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discomfort would probably be reduced
by particulars about the length of a
so-called strike, the number of doc-
tors involved, the impact on the sup-
ply of medical services, the purposes
behind it.
I will not, however, try to state the
particulars of a hypothetical case. I
hope, moreover, that the law will not
be confronted with concrete cases.
You and your colleagues may some-
day be faced with the responsibility
for bringing about or avoiding such a
confrontation. May I suggest some
factors relevant to the discharge of
that responsibility?
Each of you, individually, has con-
siderable influence as influence is
measured in our society. As a group,
you have a powerful and effective
voice. Nevertheless, you may fail to
prevent legislation that most of you
may, in good conscience, consider bad
for medicine. As to any particular
social arrangement, you may be right.
But if you are asked to withdraw your
services in protest, there are three
points that deserve attention. First,
the early opposition and the subse-
quent about-face by organized medi-
cine with respect to voluntary medical
insurance and group practice should
produce doubts that you have special
competence to pass ultimate judg-
ment on social arrangements that are
dominantly fiscal in character, even
though they may have a special im-
pact on medical practice. Secondly,
the purest motives and objectives
are unlikely to prevent legal condem-
nation of a combination to withdraw
medical services from the community.
Most Important Aspect
to Be Considered
The final consideration, which is
the most important one, is that com-
pliance by minorities with constitu-
tional legislation distasteful to them
is the price that must be paid for an
orderly democratic society. Accord-
ingly, a concerted medical boycott in
protest against enacted legislation or
impending legislation would raise
questions not wholly unlike those
raised by Governor Barnett's defiance
of the law in Mississippi. Medical
care ranks along with law and order
as a central value of our society. The
impact of conduct on such values is
always a critical factor in the law's
response to new situations. And the
high place of medical service in our
scheme of values increases the vulner-
ability of a concerted medical boycott
to legal sanctions. Perhaps that jus-
tifiable, if obvious, appeal to your
vanity will make the big stick of the
law seem more palatable to you.
[The End]
CANCER DEATH RATE RISES
The nation's second worst killer, cancer, resulted in life insurance
payments of more than $700,000,000 last year to families of American
policyholders who died from the disease, the Institute of Life Insur-
ance reports. The death rate has risen steadily for many years and
another record was set in 1962. Cancer now causes almost two out
of every ten deaths among ordinary life insurance policyholders. The
cancer death rate has risen about six times faster than the toll from
heart disease during the past two decades, although heart disease is
still the number one killer in the nation.
A factor in the rising death rate has been the medical advances'
against other diseases that enable many people to live to older ages,,
at which they become more susceptible to cancer.
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